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Japan’s Food Security Issues: A Geopolitical
Challenge for Africa and East Asia?
Thomas Feldhoff

Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany
Japan’s food self-sufficiency ratio is remarkably low compared to other industrialized
nations. Growing world population, food, water, and energy shortages in combination with
climate change and the rising competition for the world’s limited resources are the
transnational dimensions of food and nutrition security related risks that are already
affecting Japan. This paper analyzes the development and institutional context of Japanese
policies related to its food security, particularly in relation to its commitments to support
developing countries and to promote food security in Africa. One dimension of particular
interest is the Japanese engagement in large-scale land investments in Africa.
ProSAVANA, Japan’s most ambitious initiative in its development cooperation with
African countries is introduced as a case study. The international context of examining
Japan’s large-scale land investments highlights the fluctuation between its commitments
to contribute to international development policies and the more narrow-minded pursuit of
its national interests and intensified efforts to strengthen its position in international politics
in relation to powerfully emerging China.
Keywords: Food security, geopolitics, land investments, land grabbing, ProSAVANA,
Mozambique, East Asia, Japan, China

Introduction
The United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defined “food security” as
existing “when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food, which meets their dietary needs and food preferences
for an active and healthy life” (FAO, 2013, p. 16-17). Today, approximately 842 million
people globally are suffering from chronic hunger, though starvation and
undernourishment have been largely eliminated in some parts of the world. Interestingly,
even for Japan, one of the world’s richest countries, food and nutrition security (Jap.
shokuryō anzen hoshō) is a major national concern, since its high cereal import dependency
rate and low food self-sufficiency rate place Japan in a particularly vulnerable position.
Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Japan in 2013 and 2014, including expert interviews
with representatives from both the government and non-government sector, this study
draws our attention to the transnational dimensions of food security issues and the
interconnectedness between food security issues of “wealthy” and “poor” countries. In
order to set the context of the paper, the first part introduces the reader to strategies that the
Japanese government employed to ensure the long-term food security of the island nation,
where interest in stability in volumes and prices of food ranks high on the political agenda.
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The case study of ProSAVANA, Japan’s most ambitious initiative in its development
cooperation with African countries, especially with Mozambique, will be introduced.
Finally, the article attempts a prudent assessment of Japan’s and China’s challenges of
long-term food security in terms of the current geopolitical situation in East Asia and in
particular with regard to the international relations between Japan and China, which are
troubled by political, economic, and even military competition.

Japan’s Food Security in Context
Japan was well on the road to industrialization before the outbreak of the Second World
War, but still in the late 1930s around half its labor force was employed in agriculture. As
Japan began the process of recovery in the post-WWII years and emerged as the first Asian
industrialized nation, the agricultural landscape changed dramatically. According to
McCormack (2001), the postwar stagnation of the domestic agricultural system “was
matched by dependence on food imports, which had begun in the context of the postwar
food crisis and continued as Japan became locked into place as the world’s largest and most
profitable market for U.S. agricultural surpluses (wheat, corn, soybeans, etc.)” (p. 124). In
the context of carrying capacity of earth and limits to growth debates, earlier concerns
about the declining food self-sufficiency ratio as a threat to Japan’s national security
(expressed e.g. by Balaam, 1984; Ogura, 1976) appear virulent again today.
With regard to China, the most populous country in the entire world today, Lester R.
Brown earlier in the mid-1990s raised concerns about “Who will feed China?” He predicted
China’s inevitable loss of the capacity to feed itself as demand is surging and food
production capacity is eroding (Brown, 1995). After more than three and a half decades of
accelerated economic growth since China’s transformation from a state-planned socialist
economy to a state-driven market economy began in 1978, significant constraints to
domestic agricultural production have become obvious. These include but are not limited
to matters such as: the massive growth of urban agglomerations and the decline in arable
land due to urbanization-related land-use changes; the continuous out-migration of people
from rural to urban areas; increasing environmental pollution including soil erosion and
degradation as well as processes of desertification and salinization (Chen, 2007). At the
same time, the demand for imports, especially of cereals, is steadily growing with an
increasing impact on international price volatility. Furthermore, intensifying competition
for access to valuable natural resources with neighboring countries in the East Asian region
contains the seed for potential conflict.
The various challenges affecting global food and nutrition security today include:
 Continuous world population growth over the next four decades and rapid
economic growth in developing countries;
 Poverty, inequality, and dysfunctional production and consumption patterns in
both global and national systems;
 Diminishing ground water resources in many countries (including Northern
China) due to widespread over-pumping and irrigation;
 Climate change impacts on crop yields and agricultural potential;
 Environmental degradation due to overly intensive farming;
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Use of land for food or feed crops to develop biofuels to combat energy resource
shortages;
Dietary changes accentuating pressures on supply (“nutrition transition”); and
Agricultural land investments in developing countries by foreign corporations to
secure their own food supplies (“farming abroad”).

According to the Asia and Pacific Commission on Agricultural Statistics (APCAS),
developing regions as a whole have made significant progress towards hunger reduction
but marked differences across regions persist (APCAS, 2014). In most East and Southeast
Asian countries, significant reductions in both the estimated number and prevalence of
undernourishment have been achieved (see Table 1). Nevertheless, even in a comparatively
rich country like Japan, food and nutrition security is a national concern firmly rooted in
agricultural policy and development programs. Of course, use of the term has a
fundamentally different quality in Japan than in developing countries where access to food
for many people is a question of everyday survival. Admittedly, Japan is a highly
industrialized country, where agriculture is a steadily declining and increasingly less
significant area of economic activity. The contribution of agriculture to the GDP is only
1% (compared to 10% in China), and employment in agriculture is only 4% of total
employment (compared to 35% worldwide) (see Table 2).

Table 1: Food Security Indicators for East Asian Nations
Average
dietary
energy
supply
adequacy
(2011-2013)
China
Japan
Korea,
Dem. Rep.
Korea, Rep.
Taiwan
India
Developing
Regions
Developed
Regions
World

Access to
improved water
sources (% of
population w/
access) (2011)

Cereal
import
dependency
ratio
(2007-09)

Number of
people
undernourished
(millions)
(2011-13)

124
112
94

Average
protein
supply
(grams per
caput per
day) (200810)
94
90
57

92
100
98

2.2
76.8
15.2

158.0

132
118
106
118

91
89
58
73

98
N/A
92
87

73.2
85.2
0.5
15.5

N/S
1.5
213.8
826.6

135

104

99

16.0

15.7

122

79

89

15.7

842.3

7.6

Note. Average dietary energy supply adequacy: The indicator expresses the Dietary Energy Supply
(DES) as a percentage of the Average Dietary Energy Requirement (ADER) in each country. Each
country’s or region's average supply of calories for food consumption is normalized by the average
dietary energy requirement estimated for its population, to provide an index of adequacy of the food
supply in terms of calories. Analyzed together with the prevalence of undernourishment, it allows
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discerning whether undernourishment is mainly due to insufficiency of the food supply or to
particularly bad distribution (FAO Food Security Indicators).
N/A = No data available
N/S = Statistically non-significant
Source: FAO Food Security Indicators (as of
http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/ess-fadata/en/

Oct.

1,

2013).

Retrieved

from

Table 2: Agriculture in East Asia: Selected Indicators (2011)

China
Japan
Korea,
Dem.
Rep.
Korea,
Rep.
World

Agriculture
value added
(% of GDP)

Employment in
agriculture (% of
total
employment)

Land area
(million sq.
km)

Agricultural
land1 (% of
land area)

Arable
land (ha
per
person)

Arable
land2 (%
of land
area)

10
1
N/A

35
43
N/A

9.3275
0.3645
0.1204

55.7
12.5
21.2

0.08
0.03
0.09

12.0
11.7
19.1

3

73

0.0971

18.1

0.03

15.4

3.13

35

129.7123

37.6

0.2

11.9

Notes.
1 Agricultural land refers to the share of land area that is arable, under permanent crops, and under
permanent pastures.
2 Arable land includes land defined by the FAO as land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas
are counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen
gardens, and land temporarily fallow. Land abandoned as a result of shifting cultivation is excluded.
3 Figures are for 2010.
N/A = No data available
Source: The World Bank Indicators. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator

In China, the agricultural development during the post-Mao reform era was overall
extremely successful. The production yields, the exports of agricultural products, and the
international activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises have increased significantly.
However, the efforts of the Chinese government to large spatial expansion of domestic
arable land towards central Asia has proven limited despite the progresses in cultivation
technologies. Although the dry border is not sharply defined, just west of the 100th
meridian east, rain fed agriculture is possible in some years, but mostly extremely difficult
because of droughts that result in severe erosion and deflation damage, so that sufficient
yields are only possible with continuous irrigation. At the same time, cultivated land is
being lost in the southeast of China due to the intense competition over land use (e.g., for
industry, transport, and residential areas), and in the northwest of China due to processes
of soil erosion and accelerated desertification. After all, in the traditionally intensively used
agricultural regions of Eastern China, the land productivity could be increased
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considerably, not least by the huge increases in the use of fertilizers. China emerged as the
world’s largest consumer of fertilizers and the largest producer country of nitrogenous
fertilizers (see Table 3). Agriculture in these areas, however, is threatened by rising sea
levels due to global climate change with massive economic and social impacts. This is also
a challenge for Japan, which is highly dependent on agricultural imports.

Table 3: Agricultural Profiles of Five Key Nitrogen Fertilizer Markets
Arable land
(million ha)
China

166

India

186

Brazil

63

USA

100

EU

89

Top 3 crops area
harvested
2007-208 (million
ha)
Rice (29.5)
Maize (29.2)
Wheat (23.7)
Rice (43.8)
Wheat (28.0)
Millet (10.8)
Soybean (20.6)
Maize (13.8)
Sugarcane (7.1)
Maize (35.0)
Soybean (26.0)
Wheat (20.6)
Wheat (24.8)
Barley (13.7)
Maize (8.3)

Total nitrogen
application 2007-08
(kg divided by
harvested area)
191
173
182
100
110
NA
5
62
30
155
4
75
130
NA
166

Nitrogen fertilizer
demand
2010
(million t)
32.6
16.6
2.8
11.7
11.0

Source: Yara Fertilizer Industry Handbook, December (2012, pp. 20, 53)

Agriculture in Japan
Today, Japan produces only about 39% of the food it consumes (March 2013, see Statistics
Bureau of Japan, 2015). This is a major decrease from the 79% in 1960, and the lowest
food self-sufficiency ratio among all major developed countries. Surveys conducted by the
Cabinet Office reveal that consumers are becoming ever more concerned about the
dependency on food imports. One major cause is the significant changes in the Japanese
people’s diet in the post-war years with higher consumption of meat and fat in particular,
and this factor is directly linked to a decrease in the demand for domestic agricultural
produce. The proportion of rice output in total agricultural output and the per capita
consumption of rice in Japan have both decreased to roughly half from the early 1960s.
Moreover, Japan depends on a very small number of countries for the majority of its food
imports. Imports from the United States represented more than 25% of Japan’s total
agricultural imports of over $60 billion USD in 2012, and there is a particular dependence
on the United States for grains and legumes. ASEAN, China, and the EU-27 were the nextlargest suppliers with a combined share of over 39%. Meats are the largest component of
Japan’s agricultural imports, and based on the value of imports, Japan is the largest meat-
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importer in the world.1 The import dependency makes the food supply base quite
vulnerable and is also a consequence of Japan’s import liberalization policies, partly forced
by pressure from abroad, in the course of the internationalization and liberalization of
world trade.

Table 4: Commercial Agriculture and Arable Land in Japan, 1990-2012

1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2012

Commercial
farmers (million)
4.819
4.140
3.891
3.353
2.606
2.514

Percentage of those 65
years and over
33.1
43.5
58.2
58.2
61.6
60.3

Agricultural land
(million ha)
5.243
5.038
4.830
4.692
4.593
4.550

Note. “Commercial farmers” are farmers with cultivated land under management of 0.3 hectares and
over, or with annual sales of agricultural products amounting to 500,000 Yen and over.
Source: Statistics Bureau of Japan, retrieved from www.stat.go.jp

It is not surprising in this context that the global financial and agricultural price crisis
in 2007-08 has revived older debates about the food security and even national security of
Japan, including the long-term viability of its agricultural sector. Maye & Kirwan (2013)
stressed that the FAO Rome Summit on World Food Security in June 2008, initiated
directly in response to the food price increases, symbolized food security’s renewed
geopolitical status. Japanese politicians and policy-makers were reminded again of the
potential threats arising from these transnational dimensions of food security related risks.
Because of these risks, the Japanese government is now seeking to increase the food selfsufficiency ratio to 50% on a supplied calorie basis by 2020. The most important issue is
to support and maintain domestic farmers and cultivated land. However, this is not an easy
task because of the structure of Japan’s agricultural sector and a costly, unrewarding rural
development policy. In fact, the sector is facing a long-term downward trend and major
structural problems indicated by massive declines in such figures as agricultural
production’s share of Gross Domestic Product and agricultural working population
(Yamashita, 2008). Most notably, the number of farmers mostly engaged in farming and
the area of cultivated land has decreased significantly. This is mainly due to advances in
mechanization, a decrease in the prices of agricultural products and a decrease in
agricultural income, thereby reducing the domestic food supply capacity (see Table 4). The
number of abandoned farms has risen dramatically, not least because of the many older
farmers retiring and the lack of successors to existing farms. The loss of arable land due to
abandonment and conversion of farmland into residential and commercial land is mainly
due to postwar processes of industrialization and urbanization. Comparative data on
Data derived from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research
Service, retrieved from http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-trade/countriesregions/japan/trade.aspx#.U3oAFV5TbL8
1
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agricultural land area per farm household for different countries hint at another structural
problem: small- and mini-sized farms dominate Japan’s agricultural sector. That means
that the scope for major technological advances in agriculture is limited because these are
most beneficial to large farms. Tax legislation and lease rights applying to agricultural land
inhibit the rounding up of ownership shares of farmland.
Moreover, demographic change is a major challenge for rural Japan. That means that
populations are aging and decreasing, and these demographic processes reinforce
disparities between shrinking and growing cities and regions (Matanle et al., 2011).
Statistics reveal that Japan’s farming population is already dominated by the elderly 65
years of age and over (see Table 4). The government nowadays recognizes many rural
communities as “marginal settlements” (Jap. genkai shūraku) – communities living on the
edge of extinction through depopulation because people aged 65 years or older make up
more than half the total population. Hundreds of Japanese towns and villages have reached
the limits of their manageability as their low population density and reduced vitality have
led to underdeveloped local infrastructure and limited availability of services. Most
severely affected by population losses and ageing are rural areas in hilly and mountainous
regions, which cover 70% of Japan’s total land area. They are still important with regard
to agricultural production. Both the number of farm households and the cultivated land
under management in these areas account for 40% of the national total, respectively. Thus,
it is not only rural communities but the agricultural sector as a whole that is at risk of further
diminishing.
A final reason for Japan’s agricultural sector dilemma is protectionism and
interventionism, including tariff protection and price supports, mainly disadvantaging the
small group of full-time farmers. According to the OECD (2009) report on agricultural
policy reforms in Japan, improving competitiveness is essential to the future prosperity of
Japan’s agricultural sector and, thus, a key to the country’s food security. The most
important steps to secure the future prosperity of agriculture would be to establish a more
competitive, more efficient farm sector and open trade in agricultural products, and to
improve market-orientation instead of income support payments. The report explicitly
highlights the ability to produce high-quality and specialized products for local, domestic,
and even foreign markets, including the growing demand for organic food for example, as
a key strength. However, both recommendations run contrary to Japan’s traditional
agricultural protectionism and interventionism, especially in favor of rice farming. George
Mulgan (2000, 2005) and McCormack (2001) have identified the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and agricultural cooperatives known as Nōkyō (abbreviated
for Nōgyō kyōdō kumiai) as fierce defenders of this policy approach which have a vested
interest in maintaining the status quo.
Undoubtedly, the low self-sufficiency ratio makes Japan economically vulnerable. A
food crisis, caused by export bans, crop failures, unrest, or even wars in supplier countries
is the nightmare scenario – a scenario which, however, must be put into perspective by
taking into account the extraordinary economic strength of the country and its alleged
ability to manage market risks, even at significantly higher costs. The OECD (2009) states,
“most modern food security risk is price risk rather than quantity risk …” (p. 48). However,
protecting the wealthy at the expense of the vulnerable poor and developing countries poses
a serious ethical issue, and it is a potential source of instability that could threaten the
international community. After the end of the Cold War, non-traditional security challenges
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have increasingly come to the forefront. These include challenges resulting from
international migration, climate change, terrorism, or organized crime but also food,
energy, and other natural resource security issues. So far, the individual nation-states have
failed to develop instruments and strategies to effectively cope with such challenges and
are therefore in desperate need of innovative collaborative approaches. With regard to food
and nutrition security issues in Japan, structural changes in national agricultural systems,
the integration into global trade with agricultural products, and access to foreign land
through transnational land investments are in the focus of interest.
MAFF tackles food as a national security issue and actively promotes various
strategies and measures to ensure the county is able to feed the people and become more
independent from the uncertainties of the global market: firstly, to increase the quantity of
food produced domestically and to enhance productivity of the agricultural sector through
further intensification and specialization and encouraging production by core farmers and
concentration of farm holdings (this is classical productivism in agriculture); secondly, to
secure a stable import base through greater diversification and the maintenance of good
international relations with exporting countries; thirdly, to ensure adequate stock piling for
staple foods such as rice, wheat, and soybeans, as well as compound feedstuffs; and
fourthly, to enforce national “food education” (Jap. shokuiku) programs, which promote
the benefits of locally produced and purchased food and traditional Japanese diet rich in
rice, vegetables, and fish (OECD, 2009, pp. 43-49). A rather recent strategy supported by
the Japanese government is to develop programs to support agricultural developments in
current and potential future supplier countries.
The phenomenon of foreign agricultural projects in developing countries is a very
topical and politically sensitive issue. It has been frequently referred to as “land grabbing”
in the media. Indeed, large-scale investments in foreign land made by agro-energy
corporations or states have increased remarkably since the 2007-2008 global food and
energy crises (Anseeuw et al., 2012; Clements & Fernandes, 2012). “Farming abroad” has
emerged as a new food supply strategy by import-dependent governments including Japan.
In search of new investment opportunities in the aftermath of the financial crisis, investors
from the financial sector, including pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, private equity
funds, and hedge funds, became increasingly interested in farmland. Governments
promoting and supporting large-scale investments in foreign land have been criticized by
non-governmental organizations for advancing the commercial interests of the world’s
richest agribusiness corporations under the guise of promoting “food security,” especially
in Sub-Saharan Africa (War on Want, 2012).

Land Grabbing Issues
From a productivist perspective as represented by the dominant agro-industry regime, the
central solution to food security is to develop and apply new agricultural technologies in
order to increase food production. It is largely linked to the relative abundance of land,
agricultural raw materials, and low-cost labor in many developing countries. Evidence
comes from the 2009 World Bank study on the future prospects for commercial agriculture
in the Guinea Savannah Zone of Africa and beyond including a case study of Mozambique.
Based on an analysis of the factors that contributed to the successes in the development of
a competitive commercial agriculture achieved in Brazil and Thailand, the authors of

Thomas Feldhoff

83

“Awakening Africa’s Sleeping Giant” (World Bank, 2009) argue that opportunities abound
for farmers in Africa to regain international competitiveness, especially in light of projected
stronger world markets for agricultural commodities over the long term. However, Sage
(2013) criticizes that this “food agenda” is dominated by powerful economic interests of
the existing agro-industrial system, largely ignoring more sustainable forms of agriculture
that build on the agro-ecological knowledge of smallholder farmers. Large-scale land
acquisitions are frequently neglecting the interests of existing land users, excluding
smallholder agriculture, and the rural poor are frequently being dispossessed of their land
and resource rights (Anseeuw et al., 2012). What we also know from the increasing body
of studies on “land grabbing” is that many of the target regions belong to the group of the
poorest countries with serious food deficits and weak state structures, with huge deficits of
transparency and accountability. Interest in Africa’s vast arable lands in particular,
stimulated by the World Bank (2009) study, has been growing rapidly in step with concerns
about future global food security. We also know that much of the investment originates
from OECD member states, but increasingly emerging countries, particularly China and
India, have gained importance as investors in developing countries as well. The “Land
Matrix Global Observatory,” a global and independent land monitoring initiative that
promotes transparency and accountability in decisions over land and investment, provides
respective data. It promotes transparency in land transactions and supports open data
focused on land deals published in the global database “Land Matrix”. 2 As land deals are
usually not negotiated in the public realm and official data sources are rare, we know too
little about the diversity of involved governmental and non-governmental actors, and the
precise nature of negotiation and decision-making processes with regard to marketization
and mobilization of land on a transnational scale. It was only recently that Japan attracted
public interest although the country has been present as an investor in Southeast Asia and
in South America for several years and has always been an important actor in international
politics. In fact, the “Land Matrix” currently lists 17 Japanese land investment projects
abroad, with a total area of approximately 350,000 acres (about 8% of Japan’s agricultural
land). Only two of the 17 projects are located in Africa. However, according to Japanese
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent plans to catch up with China in pursuing its own
interests on the African continent this could change soon.
For two decades, the Japanese government has made efforts in the frameworks of the
Africa Asia Business Forum and the Tokyo International Conference on African
Development (TICAD) to strengthen its relations with African nations. Ampiah (2010) and
Yamada (2011) stressed that the advent of the TICAD since 1993 has raised unprecedented
public interest about Africa in Japan and brought some dynamism to how Japan attends to
issues relating to Africa’s economic development. Land investments, however, have never
been at the center stage. At TICAD IV that took place in 2008 the Japanese government
promised to double its Official Development Aid (ODA) to Africa by 2012 and to extend
up to $4 billion USD of ODA loans primarily for infrastructure and agriculture projects
(JICA, 2013). In a speech at TICAD V in June 2013 Prime Minister Abe announced
policies to encourage multi-billion dollar investment by Japanese companies in Africa and
support advances in health, education, and agriculture (Reynolds & Hirokawa, 2013).
Japan also signed an investment agreement with Mozambique, its first with a resource-rich
2

See “Land Matrix“ at www.landmatrix.org
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country in Sub-Saharan Africa. Such engagement is intended to prove the credibility of
Japan’s diplomacy towards Africa and the TICAD process. One reason for the rediscovery
of Japanese interest in Africa, of course, is the rise of China and its growing presence on
the African continent. The competition for access to land is harsh, not only economically
but also in the diplomatic and geopolitical arenas. Global multi-industry companies,
government, and semi-government organizations are among the major actors including
well-known large Japanese enterprise groups like Itochu, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, or Sumitomo.
The most important state actor involved is the Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA, Kokusai kyōryoku kikō), which facilitates the consultations between the
governments involved and overviews the implementation of development projects.

Figure 1: JICA’s Operation Scale in Fiscal Year 2012

Note. 1 “Technical Cooperation” expenses excluding management expenses. 2 Amount of “Loan Aid”
distributed. 3 Amount of concluded “Grant Aid” agreements. Source: JICA (2013, p. 15)

Established as an Incorporated Administrative Agency (Jap. dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin),
JICA is an independent governmental body which “aims to contribute to the promotion of
international cooperation as well as the sound development of Japanese and global
economy by supporting the socioeconomic development, recovery or economic stability of
developing regions.3 In terms of Official Development Assistance disbursements, Japan
ranked fifth worldwide among the member states of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) after the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France in 2012, but
only 20th in terms of the proportion of ODA to Gross National Income (JICA, 2013). JICA,
providing bilateral aid in the form of Japanese ODA loans, grant aid, and technical
3

See JICA’s homepage at www.jica.go.jp/english/about/organization/index.html
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cooperation, is one of the largest development organizations in the world (see Figure 1). In
2008, JICA emerged in its current organizational structure when the overseas economic
cooperation operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and grant
aid operations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (excluding those which MOFA continues
to directly implement for the necessity of diplomatic policy) was organizationally
integrated into JICA. Currently, it employs more than 1,800 full-time staff and oversees a
network of about a hundred overseas offices including 26 on the African continent.

Japan in Africa and ProSAVANA
Japanese food security issues are directly linked to Japanese government policies aimed at
promoting food security in Africa (MOFA, 2013), policies that intentionally result in the
marketization of African land. For example, while Mozambique’s agricultural sector
primarily consists of small farmers and large tracts of land which have generally not been
parceled out since the end of the civil war in 1992, many farmers remain unaware of their
land use rights as individuals and as communities and are in danger of being left out from
decision-making over government-acknowledged land allocations to foreign investors. The
demarcation and registration of land use rights, however, is essential when it comes to the
mobilization of land, especially in relation to the transnationalization of markets based on
inviting foreign investors from Brazil and Japan.
According to Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter approved by Cabinet
decision in August 2003, the main objectives of ODA are “to contribute to the peace and
development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own
security and prosperity.” The link to Japanese self-interests and “strategy diplomacy
efforts, such as resource development strategies, reinforcing maritime safety and security
capacity and strengthening cybersecurity” (JICA, 2013, p. 18), is being made explicit.
Rather loose historical ties with African nations and the absence of any colonial legacy,
however, is seen as a Japanese advantage in providing development assistance according
to each recipient country’s specific needs. During the five-year period from 2008 to 2012,
Japan spent an average of $1.815 billion USD total annual ODA contributions to Africa
(JICA, 2013).4 Among others, JICA is involved in projects supporting the establishment
and improvement of economic development corridors and value chains for agricultural
products as well as the promotion of agricultural development and rice production to
increase food production. In its recent annual report JICA (2013) argues,
Due to the potential and the enormous internal demand for food, Africa is one of the
world’s most attractive continents for agricultural development. To this end, Africa needs
to raise the incomes of individual farmers. Plans for agricultural development are to be
created at the national level, productivity is to be raised by modernizing agricultural
operations and market-oriented agriculture such as growing value-added crops must is to
be [sic] introduced. (p. 54)

Brautigam (2011, p. 211) assessed that in 2008, China disbursed about $1.2 billion USD in Official
Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa, compared with the World Bank ($4.1 billion USD), the
United States ($7.2 billion USD), and France ($3.4 billion USD). She estimates that Chinese aid
probably rose to $1.4 billion USD in 2009.
4
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With regard to agricultural development projects, the promotion of stable food
production in aid receiving countries of course also contributes to global price stability and
to ensure food security in Japan itself. JICA, of course, stresses the tangible benefits for
the target countries: previously unused land would be made productive; technology transfer
is taking place in the agricultural sector of the target country and thus the local food
situation will be improved; jobs would arise and thus poverty be tackled effectively; and
additional investments in the development of economic and social infrastructures of
underdeveloped rural areas contribute to the strengthening of local community resilience.
Hidden from public interest for several years, Japan under JICA leadership has been
involved in the so-called ProSAVANA project in Mozambique. It was only recently that
Japan got caught up in the maelstrom of critical reporting on land grabbing (Funada
Classen, 2013; Nogueira & Ollinaho, 2013). In fact, the governments of Japan, Brazil, and
Mozambique have been pursuing their “Triangular Cooperation for Agricultural
Development of the Tropical Savannah in Mozambique (ProSAVANA-JBM),”
implemented in the framework of the Japan Brazil Partnership Program since 2009 (see
Figure 2). This project is intended as a model for trilateral cooperation and sustainable
agricultural development in the tropical savannah region of northern Mozambique with its
extensive areas of land. It aims to fundamentally restructure the agricultural sector in the
region by introducing modern farming techniques and increasing capital investment to
expand production and increase productivity (ProSAVANA, 2009, 2013). Brazilian
proponents stress that the project is related to knowledge and technologies that have proven
successful in their own country thanks to the previous development support of Japan, and
that their agricultural expertise can be transferred to African countries in an adapted form.
The Brazilian reference project is PRODECER, a program of Brazilian and Japanese
corporations for the agricultural development of the Cerrado savannah in central Brazil
from the 1970s to the 1990s. The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Empresa
Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, EMBRAPA) and its partner institutions have
successfully improved soil quality, developed new plant varieties for the tropical and
subtropical regions, and pioneered new operational farm techniques including no-till
agriculture (Lopes et al., 2012). JICA supported EMBRAPA’s Cerrado-related activities
since it started its research in 1974. Partnerships with national and transnational
agribusiness corporations have also been signed to make these innovations available for
production. Today, the Cerrado is one of the world’s largest export-oriented producers of
soybeans and accounts for 70% of Brazil’s farm output. Overall, Brazilian agricultural
exports over the past decades have generated significant economic surpluses and
contributed to the country’s economic growth (Clements & Fernandes, 2012). Whereas
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC),
and the Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique (MINAG) signed the basic framework for
the ProSAVANA program in September 2009, EMBPRAPA and the Agricultural Research
Institute of Mozambique (IIAM) are also involved.
ProSAVANA will comprise an area of more than 100,000 km2 of land in
Mozambique’s “Nacala Corridor” covering 19 districts in the three provinces of Nampula,
Niassa, and Zambezia (see Figure 2). Currently uncultivated land will be exploited and
existing smallholder agriculture on community land shall in part be replaced by agroindustrial businesses to stimulate economic growth through increased production of food
and agricultural commodities, mainly for export. The project will include, in the first stage
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of production, soybean, corn, cotton, and rice, and create more than 4,000 new jobs in
agricultural production, inputs production, and logistics operation. Essential components
of ProSAVANA are to increase productivity through technology transfer, to foster the
creation of associations led by foreign investors that integrate local small farmers via
contract farming, investments into export-oriented agriculture value chains, and transfer of
agricultural land to foreign investors (mainly from Brazil). Because all land in
Mozambique is government-owned and cannot be purchased or sold, the acquisition of
land use rights (DUAT, direito de uso e aproveitamento da terra) with the Government of
Mozambique is required.
In September 2012, a $750,000 USD Project Development Initiative Fund was
launched under the tri-party agreement between the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture,
Mozambican financial institution GAPI (Small Scale Industry Support Office), and JICA
to finance selected agri-businesses in the Nacala Corridor on a piloting basis to showcase
the potential for agriculture development in the Nacala Corridor. In the future, financial
resources for the agricultural development are intended to be provided through means of a
Luxembourg regulated private equity fund (Nacala Corridor Fund) developed by Brazilian
consulting company Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), which is also involved in the
elaboration of the ProSAVANA Master Plan and its implementation. The objective of this
investment fund is “to invest private equity growth capital to develop and operate own
plantation, processing, trading and logistic companies to grow, process and supply
agricultural products to local, regional and global export markets” (FGV Projetos, p. 37)
and to improve the regional rural transport and logistics infrastructure. According to
Chichava et al. (2013) the fund is expected to attract around $2 billion USD. Both the
Project Development Initiative Fund and the Nacala Corridor Fund are not formally part
of ProSAVANA but essential instruments for its realization.
Massive investments in the improvement of existing transport infrastructures are part
of the broader project for “Nacala Corridor Economic Development Strategies,” covering
an area that extends across national borders from the Nacala Port to inland districts of
Mozambique and further to neighboring countries Malawi and Zambia. The five provinces
in Mozambique related to the Nacala Corridor cover an area of about 500,000 km2 with a
population of 14 million people. The development corridor concept, also promoted by the
New Partnership for Africa’s Development Secretariat and the African Development Bank
(Mulenga, 2013), is expected to induce growth by promoting trade and private sector
investments in infrastructure, mineral resources (coal, natural gas), and agriculture
development based on an integrated strategy. In this context, Japan’s ODA finances key
infrastructure projects to expand and upgrade the country’s export routes, including the
modernization and expansion of the deep-water port of Nacala (depth >14m) and the
upgrading of more than 650 km of trunk roads along the Nacala Corridor (see Table 5).
The principal strategic importance of the region is as an export corridor for the output of
Brazilian coal mining operations in Mozambique’s landlocked Tete Province (Chichava et
al., 2013, p. 3).
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Figure 2: ProSAVANA-JBM Project Development Area in Mozambique

Source: Prepared by the author based on JICA project presentations.

Nogueira and Ollinaho (2013, p. 5) stress that from Japan’s strategic interest
perspective, the investments in Mozambique aim at increasing world food production and
thus stabilizing global food prices. Japan, at the same time, profiles itself in the role of an
active supporter of South-South development cooperation in the international community.
OECD member states like Japan have become very much aware of the rise of new nontraditional development assistance donors and have started to push for South-South cooperations to integrate them into their own strategies with the objective of policy coordination and harmonization. South-South cooperation was also identified by JICA as a
pillar to achieve the so-called Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD) goals to
double the rice production in Africa between 2009 and 2018 (JICA, 2009). With regard to
ProSAVANA in particular, Japan justified the program as a “win-win-win” initiative and
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stressed “sustainability,” “country ownership,” and “involvement of a diverse set of actors”
as principles of its cooperation with Brazil and Mozambique (JICA, personal
communication, March 25, 2014). Japan also initiated international negotiations for a set
of principles for responsible agricultural investment (PRAI) that respects rights,
livelihoods, and resources. The FAO, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), the World Bank, and the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD) eventually adopted the seven principles (see Table 6).

Table 5: Japan’s ODA Agreements with Mozambique 2007-2014 (Loans)
Project name

Location

National road upgrading
National road upgrading
Port development (Phase I)
National road upgrading
Gas-fired combined cycle
power plant development

Montepuez-Lichinga
Nampula – Cuamba
Nacala Port
Mandimba – Lichinga
Maputo

ODA loan
(billion Yen)
3.282
5.978
7.889
6.773
17.2

Date of
approval
March 2007
March 2010
March 2013
November 2013
January 2014

Source: JICA ODA Loan project DATA and JICA press releases.

Nevertheless, international development NGOs, environmental groups, and
smallholder farmers’ organizations, heavily criticize the supposed Brazilian development
model. In the case of Cerrado, large-scale intensive grain monocultures had a dramatic
impact on the ecosystem, causing a rapid loss of biodiversity. Clements and Fernandes
(2012) report that land prices have increased significantly across the country as a result of
the purchase of land by foreign investors in Brazil. The focus on capital-intensive agroindustrial production for export replaced traditional family agriculture and did not create
sufficient employment opportunities for all the people who have been displaced by the
externally imposed structures. The National Union of Mozambican Peasants (UNAC,
União Nacional de Camponeses, Moçambique) is therefore concerned about similar effects
on the Mozambican countryside and among others supported by La Via Campesina, the
international peasants’ movement defending small-scale sustainable agriculture as a way
to promote social justice and dignity, and GRAIN, an international non-profit organization
that supports small farmers and social movements in their efforts to realize communitycontrolled food systems. UNAC released a statement of protest against ProSAVANA in
October 2012, followed by another statement of protest by Justiça Ambiental and FOE
(Friends of the Earth) Mozambique in January 2013 (JA and FOE Mozambique, 2013).
UNAC representatives also attended several events organized by Japanese nongovernmental organizations and citizens in Tokyo, Japan, in February 2013 to facilitate a
dialogue with the Japanese government and JICA. 5

A more detailed analysis of the voices from civil society of Mozambique can be found in Funada
Classen (2013) and the ProSAVANA Civil Society Report 2013.
5
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Table 6: The Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI)
Principle 1: Existing rights to land and associated natural resources are recognized and
respected.
Principle 2: Investments do not jeopardize food security but rather strengthen it.
Principle 3: Processes relating to investment in agriculture are transparent, monitored, and
ensure accountability by all stakeholders within a proper business, legal, and regulatory
environment.
Principle 4: All those materially affected are consulted, and agreements from consultations are
recorded and enforced.
Principle 5: Investors ensure that projects respect the rule of law, reflect industry best practice,
are viable economically, and result in durable shared value.
Principle 6: Investments generate desirable social and distributional impacts and do not
increase vulnerability.
Principle 7: Environmental impacts of a project are quantified and measures taken to
encourage sustainable resource use, while minimizing the risk/magnitude of negative impacts
and mitigating them.
Source: UNCTAD, retrieved from www.unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/G-20/PRAI.aspx

UNAC is concerned that resident farm families will lose their farmland in the course
of the project and would at best end up being hired in the future in the agricultural industry
as low-paid farm laborers. ProSAVANA disregards the traditional rights of local small
farmers, undermines traditional land use rights, and replaces traditional land management
practices by monocultures of the global agribusiness. It provides impetus for the
registration of land use rights to facilitate foreign investment, whereas local farmers and
communities do not receive adequate government support to express their rights to land.
As a result of land expropriation and resettlement, “landless” impoverished communities
will appear which could easily boil over into social upheaval. The organization calls for
greater transparency, access to planning documents and information, and participation of
the affected small farmers on the ground (UNAC, personal communication, February 27
and 28, 2013). Environmental impact or social impact assessments are not known to date,
although JICA has strict guidelines for environmental and social considerations in place
(JICA, 2010). Nogueira and Ollinaho (2013) argue that the ProSAVANA project is a
manifestation of the recent mainstream development assistance storyline that herald
foreign land investments in Africa as a potential opportunity for rural development. Foreign
land investments are perceived as the answer to low agricultural productivity and
underdevelopment in Mozambique, “taking for granted that ‘development will naturally
follow’ economic growth” (Nogueira & Ollinaho, 2013, p. 14). JA and FOE Mozambique
(2013) question the benefits for Mozambique and highlight that “Japan intends to ensure,
outside its territory, a new source of agricultural goods at low costs, with the purpose of
exporting them to the Asian market, especially Japan and China” (no pagination). It comes
as no surprise that the Principles for Responsible agricultural investment were forcefully
rejected by civil society organizations in Japan and exposed as a legitimation strategy for
land grabbing (GRAIN, 2012). As a more promising development model alternative to the
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export-oriented industrialization of agriculture, already back in 1996, La Via Campesina
proclaimed the right of peoples to “food sovereignty,” which includes not only the right to
food but also the access to and control over natural resources such as land, water, and seeds;
self-sufficiency should take precedence over exports and world trade and traditional food
cultures be maintained (Claeys, 2013).
Despite the criticism, in early April 2013, representatives of the three countries signed
an agreement to implement the project. A document entitled “Support Agriculture
Development Master Plan in the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique (ProSAVANA-PD),
Report No. 2” (ProSAVANA, 2013) was leaked in March 2013 and considered as the draft
master plan for the project by civil society organizations (JA et al., 2013). All three
governments, however, denied the existence of a master plan, and JICA representatives in
March 2014 expressed the view that the master plan will not be accomplished before mid2015 (JICA, personal communication, March 25, 2014). This leaves the governments some
room for maneuver towards addressing certain aspects of criticism on the implementation
of ProSAVANA.

Conclusion: Food Security Issues as a Global Challenge and Japan’s Strive
for a Stronger Position in International Politics
Food and nutrition security is not a past issue; it is a pressing global challenge, because it
means a stability risk, which may involve national, regional, and international conflicts.
Japan, heavily dependent on food imports, has to cope with food security challenges, given
its rapidly shrinking agricultural sector. Japan’s recent engagement in agricultural
development of the African tropical savannah, such as ProSAVANA, is motivated by its
aspiration to enhance food security. ProSAVANA, however, has been criticized as a form
of neo-colonialist economic exploitation “skilfully wrapped up in the language of
‘greenwash’ … and sold to Mozambicans and the international community under the guise
of ‘sustainable agricultural development” (Clements & Fernandes, 2012, p. 18). In many
African academic writings and commentaries, such land investments are regarded as a
symptom of the new Asian colonization of Africa, no matter where in Asia the investment
actually comes from (Kisika, 2014; Nelson, 2009). From the perspective of the individual
states, matters of food or energy security are a fundamental basis for economic and political
stability.
Vis-à-vis food security and against this background, the efforts of Japan to strengthen
its position are nonetheless understandable. The Tokyo International Conference on
African Development (TICAD) has been created as an important mechanism to strengthen
Japan-Africa ties. It became even more important in 2004-05 when the proposals for UN
Security Council (UNSC) reform to address its “democratic deficit” and loss of legitimacy
became hotly debated (Jiang, 2011). At that time, Japan and Germany, the second and third
largest contributors to the United Nations, had been striving for a permanent seat in the UN
Security Council for nearly two decades. Along with Germany, Brazil, and India, Japan is
member of the so-called “Group of Four” (G-4), which advocates for a reorganization of
that body, also demanding to increase the presence of African countries on the council.
Both Brazil and India are also part of the group of the economically emerging BRICS
countries. Such UN reorganization would, however, require the broad support of the
General Assembly, which should explain Japan’s interest in good relations with African
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countries. ODA became increasingly recognized as an important means to strengthen
Japan’s standing in the international arena and eventually secure a permanent UNSC seat.
It comes as no surprise that Japan is an active member of international organizations
promoting major development projects in Africa. It is involved in the “African Agricultural
Growth Corridors” initiative, which was first proposed at the UN General Assembly in
2008 and then at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2009 and 2010, and the “New
Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition,” a commitment by G8 nations, African countries
and private sector partners to invest in African agriculture. This alliance was originally
launched during the G8 Summit at Camp David in 2012, and each of the African countries
involved is working in collaboration with one or more G8 member countries. Japan and
the United States are Mozambique’s partner countries. As many of the investment plans
are from international agro-business, Paul and Steinbrecher (2013) argue that both
initiatives will reinforce each other in a major effort “to reorder land and water use and
create industrial infrastructure over millions of hectares in order to ensure sustained
supplies of commodities and profits for markets” (p. 1). This externally imposed reordering would enhance the likelihood of conflicts over land and threaten to eliminate the
livelihoods of local communities (see also Rajaonarison, 2014).
Japan actively pursues a number of policies and initiatives to reaffirm its ambitions in
international politics. Seemingly legitimized by international policy initiatives to
contribute to agricultural and other development projects in Africa, Japan is also seeking
to make rural areas in Africa available for tangible self-interests of its own food and
nutrition security. Competition with China over natural resources and food supplies
presents major challenges and creates additional stress for political elites in East Asia.
Several sea territories are subject of competing claims and disputes over small islands and
coral reefs in the East China Sea and South China Sea involve geo-strategic and military
interests, economic interests in the expansion of fishing rights and access to suspected oil
and gas reserves. Competition for access to and control over strategically important
international sea-lanes, serving as lifelines for a significant share of world trade, will
remain part of international relations for the foreseeable future (Zhao, 2008). The repeated
outbreaks of conflict are an expression of increasing “resource nationalism” and the
associated strategic rivalries with China investing massively in expanding its armed forces,
particularly its naval capacity. It is not by coincidence that China opposed a Japanese
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.
This outline of potential for serious conflict does not imply an inevitable military
outbreak of hostilities, though the competition “may become the spark for regional and
international instability” (Zhao, 2008, p. 226). With U.S. hegemony in decline, “a new
pattern of multi-directional and mutual global pressures for continuous change and
reorientation” (Machetzki, 1996, p. 224) has emerged. The strength of East Asia as a
comparatively new global center of global power politics needs to be measured not only in
terms of its economic weight, but also in terms of its ability to use this weight effectively
in international negotiation and conflict resolution. This also includes increased awareness
of the moral responsibility to contribute to the reduction of hunger and malnutrition around
the world beyond pursuing self-interest. Willingness to build transregional partnership and
reinforce mutual cooperation in various policy fields, including food and nutrition security,
could be an essential ingredient in overcoming mistrust among countries facing similar
challenges.
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